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Collings: Criminal Law and Procedure

Criminal Law and Procedure
by Rex A. Collings, Jr. *
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every
advantage.
Our dangers do not lie in too little
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been
always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear
is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that
obstructs, delays and defeats the prosecution of crime. 1
The time has come, I believe, when the nation should
face up to the hard task of considering an amendment
to the self-incrimination clause that will preserve all the
Framers said and some of the Court's extensions, modify

* A.B. 1935, M.A. 1948, J.D. 1951,
University of California, Berkeley.
Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Member, California
State Bar.
The author extends his appreciation
to Henry W. Holmes, student, and to
Kathryn Sommarstrom, secretary, at
37
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

the School of Law, University of California, and to J. Patrick Heron, student
at Golden Gate College, School of Law,
for their assistance in preparation of
this article.
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others, expunge some altogether, and guard against
accretions seemed to be in the making. 2
Recently one of my favorite TV performers said: "I hate
to look in a mirror. I realize I am a schnook." Our Supreme
Court justices are human beings. Why won't some of them
look in the mirror? Why don't they realize that they are
parts of Supreme Courts not SUPREME Courts? I had a
number of barbs removed from last year's article by the
then editor, a good friend of mine. One of them was a reference to a poem by Robert Burns:
Oh wad some power the giftie gie us
To see oursels as others see us!
It wad frae many a blunder free us,
An' foolish notion.
Where are we going? Some of us remember the old
Washington, D.C. We went there with our high school graduation class. High school classes went to Washington (wellchaperoned, of course), stayed at cheap hotels and had a
wonderful time seeing the cherry blossoms and Mr. Hoover's
Justice Department, sneaking kisses, buying pimple cures, etc.
Those were the good old days. They are gone. Today, the
high schools ignore the "great" city. It is a dangerous place
for teenagers. Rape and robbery are rampant. Banks are
robbed under the eaves of the White House. The Supreme
Court sends home with bodyguards its secretaries who work
after dark.
A hotel clerk or door attendant in Washington will practically beg you not to go out after dark. In fact it is somewhat
dangerous to ride a bus in the daytime at least in some areas.
San Francisco and Los Angeles have not quite reached this
point. But they are on the way. Washington is practically
a dead city at night. If you have to visit a big city go to
Chicago. Mayor Daley and his police force apparently have
it under control. It is still fairly safe to wander Chicago
streets at night.
2. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitu578
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And what of the latest crime statistics? Incidentally, I
am a little upset with our California Bureau of Criminal
Statistics for being so apologetic concerning its statistics.
They have done an outstanding job and should never apologize. There can be little doubt that our Bureau keeps the
best crime statistics in the world. This has, been true for a
long time. What do these statistics show? In a few sentences
I am going to use them to demonstrate that the crime situation
in California is tragic.
In 1954, the year before People v. Cahan,S the year before
the California Supreme Court started to "lead" us into "liberalism," the crime index for major crimes per 100,000 persons
in California was 1062.4 By 1967, the latest available year,
it has risen to 2435.8 per 100,000. In other words for each
100,000 persons in California in 1967, over 2400 major
crimes were committed. To put it another way, for each 100
persons in California 2t major felonies were committedserious felonies-murder, force able rape, robbery, burglary,
aggravated assault, larceny or auto theft. Or to put it still
another way one out of every 40 persons in California, counting infants and old age pensioners, committed a serious felony
in 1967.
I use the year of the Cahan case for comparison, because
that is the year that the California Supreme Court went to
work to become a far-out liberal court. Since then there
has been nothing but trouble.
Consider some other statistics from our state figures. Felony arrests for all (not major) felonies have only risen from
487 per 100,000 in 1954 to 708.9 per 100,000 in 1967. To
state this another way felony arrests have risen 45 % since
1954 on the basis of population. Major crimes on the other
hand have gone up 135% on the same basis-three times as
fast as arrests. We are without doubt losing the crime war!
3. 44 Ca1.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 50
A.L.R.2d 513 (1955).
4. The statistics and calculations
based upon them used in this article
come from California, Department of
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Crime in California 1954 and California, Department of Justice, Bureau of
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It is difficult to find figures in comparing these various

reports that show anything which is not unfavorable. In
1967 there were 265,780 reported burglaries and 6962 felony
burglary convictions. Realizing that the same burglaries do
not necessarily take place the year of the trials, the statistics
seem to show that for every 38 reported burglaries, there is
only one conviction. Similar statistics show only one conviction for every 12 robberies.
Population in California since 1954 has been increasing
4% a year. Major crimes have been increasing 19% a year,
almost five times as fast as the population increase.
Who should we blame for all of this? I think this article
demonstrates that a major part of the problem belongs to
our supreme courts. Permissiveness is not only a problem
of principals and parents and deans and trustees and regents
and chancellors and college presidents and university presidents. It is not only a problem of disgusted and frustrated
policemen who sometimes turn their backs on crime. It is
not only a problem of the so-called silent majority. It is the
problem of us all, but especially appellate courts which are
next to it. I realize that I am tilting at windmills, but perhaps
a few people will get mad as a result of this article. We
frightened a few supreme court justices at the last judicial
election. Perhaps next time we can scare them again. In any
event, hopefully, they will not become too complacent. Some
of them are certainly not representing their constituents.
The first ten amendments of the United States Constitution,
as everyone knows, were intended to protect citizens of the
newly formed federalist states from machinations of federal
bureaucrats. However, in 1868, a curve was thrown called
the Fourteenth Amendment. This provided in part that a
person could not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without "due process" of law. By twisting and torturing "due
process," the United States Supreme Court with some assistance from state courts, especially in California, has quite
effectively deprived all state citizens of the protection of the
first ten amendments. We now in effect have federal criminal
procedure, as declared by the United States Supreme Courthttp://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/22
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often by the familiar five to four decisions-running and ruining state criminal procedures.
In California this process is often accelerated by an eager
majority of our Supreme Court. The majority seems to want
Washington to run California criminal procedure. They like
the trend to Washington dictatorship. They even try to
anticipate the United States Supreme Court and be the leaders
in destroying state's rights in criminal procedure. 5
Enough of thatl
It might be of some interest to know what the problem is
in preparing an article such as this. In connection with its
preparation. I screened all United States Supreme Court
decisions as well as all California decisions which pertained to the subject. Two research assistants who perhaps
did not know I was checking on them did the same job. I
very carefully examined their "rejects" and reinstated some
20% for further examination. They were usually right. It is
not always easy for a law student (or a law professor for that
matter) to know a "good" case when he sees one.
I carefully read all relevant United States Supreme Court
criminal procedure decisions. Many of them state California
law. I decided, however, not to discuss them. Rather I cited
them in notes.
California Supreme Court decisions of course must be read
and reread. There were approximately 80. Courts of appeal
decisions ran over 600. Half of the reported decisions in
California this year are criminal law and criminal procedure
decisions. Half of the pages in the reports are criminal law
and criminal procedure decisions. I started to keep talleys,
but did not complete them. This year, like last year, I decided
to cover the decisions extensively, rather than intensively.
I probably missed decisions which should have been discussed. If I did, call them to my attention, and they will
be mentioned next year. If some fine young lawyer would
like to be a part of this project, let him contact me. It is
not easy.
5. See discussion Cal Law Trends and
Developments 1967, p. 386.
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Probably some who read the article last year wonder why
there were only 80 California Supreme Court criminal law
and procedure decisions this year as against 100 last year.
I think it is because there was but one death penalty decision,
where the degree of the murder was reduced. The court
held back on the death penalty cases until it could decide
the constitutionality of the death penalty. This it did, but
after the end date for this article which was September 30,
1968. 6
Wouldn't it be nice if the courts of appeal would observe
California Rules of Court 976(b) which purports to forbid
publication of opinions which do not involve new and important issues of law, changes in established principles of law,
or matters of general public interest? Many of their decisions are junk. We have all become used to throwing junk
mail in the scrap basket. I suppose we can learn to throw
junk decisions in the same place. My children enjoy them.
They are very helpful in kindling a fire in the fireplace.
Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Penal Code Revision Project
was published this year. 7 The draft is extensive and would
update the present archaic penal code to a considerable
extent. Some of the suggestions will be discussed from time
to time in the course of this article. The draft would make
it a defense if a person as a result of mental illness "lacked
substantial capacity to know or understand what he was
doing was wrong." At first glance this sounds like a change
in the law, but when read with People v. Wolff,S it quickly
becomes apparent that it is not.
In the attempt statute the draftsmen propose to modernize
the law of attempt and do away with archaic notions that
for attempt there must be something dangerously near to
completion of the offense. Under our present day notion
of criminal law, a person who attempts a crime is as dangerous
as a person who completes it. Both must be subjected to

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/22

6. In re Anderson, 69 Ca1.2d - , 73
Cal.Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117 (1968).
7. Joint Legislative Committee for
Revision of the Penal Code, Tentative
Draft No.2 (1968).
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confinement where necessary. The proposed revision would
move what is now attempt far back into the area of preparation. Lying in wait, reconnoitering, collecting materials to
commit a crime, could constitute an attempt. There need
be no clear and present danger that the crime would be completed.
It is hoped that many California lawyers, judges as well
as laymen will send their comments on the draft to the project
director, Professor Arthur H. Sherry, University of California,
Berkeley, that is, assuming the pickets allow the mail to go
through.
Criminal Procedure
Pretrial Procedure
Investigation. 9 The United States Supreme Court this year
"discovered" and approved "stop and frisk." In Terry v.
Ohio 1o the court approved a limited search for weapons in

a legitimate investigation where the peace officer, although
without reasonable grounds to make an arrest, is justified
in believing that the person being investigated is armed and
dangerous to the officer or others. In Sib ron v. New Y ork ll
(two cases), the court upheld the New York "stop and frisk"
law, reversing in one case because the peace officer did not
have sufficient grounds to warrant a belief that the suspect
was armed and dangerous.
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Sibron suggests
that the court has laid down an important new development
in the law. However, almost simultaneously with its adoption
of the exclusionary rule in 1955, the California Supreme
Court determined that events short of reasonable cause for
arrest may justify investigation. Furthermore, such circum9. Two important eavesdropping decisions were Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 88 S.Ct.
507 (1967) and Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S.
378, 20 L.Ed.2d 1166, 88 S.Ct. 2096
(1968); see, also, Comment, Constitutional Limitations on Pre-Arrest In-

vestigations, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1031
(1968).
10. 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88
S.Ct. 1868 (1968).
11. 392 U.S. 40, 20 L.Ed.2d 917,
88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968).
CAL LAW 1969
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stances may also justify a "frisk" or "patting down" for
weapons. 12 Some recent decisions illustrating applications
of the doctrine as well as some of its pitfalls are cited in
the footnote. 13 One interesting loser was Sanchez. 14 He, a
suspected dope peddler, was seen to go into a pedestrian
tunnel several different times with different persons, always
coming out the same end of the tunnel he had first used.
Officers entered both ends of the tunnel and accosted him.
He immediately reached into his pocket. The officer, fearing
Sanchez was going for a weapon, grabbed his hand which
was found to contain a box of narcotics. He also was armed.
His main contention was that he was confined without probable cause at the time the officers entered both ends of the
tunnel. The court upheld the arrest, search and seizure.
Can a defendant represented by counsel of his own choice
fail to object to his confessions at three trials and then on
habeas corpus claim that they were involuntary despite his
abandonment of an appeal? The supreme court held by a
four to three decision that he can. 15 The murder and mutilation of the victim took place sometime before midnight. The
defendant had been drinking but a finding that his first confession at 1 a.m. was voluntary was upheld by the supreme
court. However, he made three later confessions ten, fifteen,
and twenty hours later which the majority thought should
have been excluded. Shortly after the first confession he was
given a large dose of a tranquilizer (thorazine) because of emotional upset. There was some evidence that the combination
of thorazine and alcohol might increase the effects of alcohol
as well as slow down recovery from its effects. However, his
own expert testified that he could not state that the defendant's free will was destroyed, and that the defendant had the
ability to choose whether he would answer questions or not.
12. See, e.g., People v. Martin, 46
Cal.2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956); People
v. Blodgett, 46 Cal.2d 114, 293 P.2d
57 (1956).
13. People v. Britton, 264 Cal. App.
2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1968); People v. Nunn, 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70
584
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259 Cal. App.2d 399, 66 Cal. Rptr.
246 (1968).
14. People v Sanchez, 256 Cal. App.
2d 700, 64 Cal. Rptr. 33 J (1967).
15. In re Cameron, 68 Ca1.2d 487,
67 Cal. Rptr. 529, 439 P.2d 633 (1968).
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There was ample evidence that the defendant exercised his
own judgment in making all three of the questioned confessions. The trial judge so found. The referee so found. And
the three dissenting justices so found. In fact a reading of
the majority opinion leaves one wondering whether they really
felt they had grounds for reversal. Another murderer goes
free. However, since his first confession was held to be voluntary, perhaps he can be retried.
The courts have practically destroyed the use of the line-up
(sometimes called showup or identification parade). The
Supreme Court has invented a "due process" right to have
counsel at the line-up.I6 It has also held that the line-up must
be fair, that is, not unnecessarily suggestive. 1'1 Small wonder
that one police department which was a model for a wellknown TV program has done away with the line-up altogether. Doubtless it will struggle along with a less fair device-showing mugshots of suspects to witnesses. These of
course provide prison pictures complete with numbers, prison
haircuts, and front and side views. The witness will be told
to ignore the numbers and consider the pictures on their merits.
I have no doubt that there have been abuses in the use of the
line-up. It is not always easy on short notice to find several
persons who resemble the suspect. But should this investigative tool be destroyed altogether? Perhaps we will soon see
a decision where the courts will hold that there was a denial
of due process because no line-up was held.
Other police forces continue to use the line-up but have
developed policies which make it rather difficult to use. Furthermore, agile defense counsel look for defects in the policies
for the purpose of testing possible technical flaws and thereby
freeing the guilty. The courts are not alone in freeing the
guilty.
I asked one distinguished defense attorney what he does
with the new rule that created a right for the defendant to
16. See, e.g., United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87
S.Ct. 1926 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178,
87 S.Ct. 1951 (1967).
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have counsel present at the line-up. He said: "I go." I asked
what he did while he was there. He said: "I sit." Of course
he is we]] paid for his services. I wonder what the reaction
is of public defenders and other court appointed counsel who
are called at 3 a.m. to attend a line-up.
As might be expected we see the effects of the line-up
cases in our courts. One important decision was People v.
Caruso 18 where the supreme court held that the line-up was
unnecessarily suggestive. Apparently the other participants
in the line-up did not closely resemble the suspect. He was
a very distinctive appearing person. The facts occurred before
the newly created doctrines of Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall
v. Denno. 19 The poor policemen should have hired a mind
reader to anticipate those decisions. One would doubt on
reading the decision that the defendant can be tried again.
Perhaps he will be captured (and freed again?) sometime in
the future for some other offense. Meanwhile the police go
on playing the game-if they don't get disgusted and resign.
Who would want to be a cop in California?
Or consider, People v. Espinoza Menchaca. 20 The line-up
included a defendant of "Mexican extraction," and others who
were not. Without ever seeing the witnesses or the others in
the line-up and without discussing whether the defendant's
"Mexican extraction" was apparent, the court reversed. How
do you know if a person is of Mexican extraction? Such
persons often look no different than anyone else. I am of
Mexican extraction yet apparently no one ever noticed it.
Perhaps my name is not a dead giveaway. But should I assume the name Jose Antonia de Medina, the name of one
of my forebears perhaps it would be required that others of
such Mexican descent be placed in my line-up. Phooey!
My skin is quite white and my eyes continue to be hazel. Many
"Mexicans" have very white skin and blue, green, or hazel
eyes. You can't categorize a person by his race, especially if
you are on an appellate court where you don't see him. Why

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/22

18. 68 Cal.2d 183, 65 Cal. Rptr.
336, 436 P.2d 336 (1968). For further
discussion of this case, see Harvey,
EVIDENCE, in this volume.
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can't appellate courts leave factual problems to the trial courts
who see the witnesses?
Again in People v. Hogan/ a "Negro" defendant was placed
in a line-up with a "Mexican" and three "Caucasions." This
was held to be a discriminatory line-up. Perhaps it was. But
how does an appellate court know that a line-up is unfair?
Why not leave this to the jury's determination of the weight
of the evidence? They saw the witnesses.
In any event these decisions and others should spell out
guidelines to counsel. If the line-up is used the police must
lean over backwards to make it fair. If a person of "Mexican"
extraction, whatever that means, is placed in a line-up with
"Caucasions," whatever that means, at least evidence should
be placed in the record to show that they were similar in appearance. The victim must choose between similar persons.
What should the police do for the time being? Perhaps
they should forget about line-ups and show pictures to the
victims. If so, they. should then consider eliminating prison
identification numbers. How do they know what they should
do?
California Vehicle Code section 2814, recently adopted,
permits roadblocks to inspect motor vehicles. A group of
California Highway Patrol officers check vehicles for license,
registration, brakes, lights, smog devices, etc. A mechanic
checks the focus of headlights. In People v. De La Torre,2
they noticed something else. This caused them to file a complaint for a violation of the Vehicle Code section 23102 for
driving while under the influence of an intoxicating beverage.
The trial judge ruled section 2814 unconstitutional and dismissed the complaint. The appellate department reversed as
did the court of appeal. The per curiam decision contains a
useful summary of the various roadblock cases. s
1. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr.
448 (1968).
2. 257 Cal. App.2d 162, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 804 (1967).
3. See also, Comment, Interference
with the Right to Free Movement:
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Arrest, search and seizure. The plight of a peace officer
who is trying to do his job and outguess the courts is a perplexing one. Consider the saga of the Huntington Beach Police
Department on Halloween night in 1966, which came to a
tragic end in People v. Marshall. 4 My students wiIl probably
nickname this the "trick-or-treat" case.
The police used an informer to make a purchase of marijuana at an apartment. The transaction took place in the
bedroom of the apartment, and the informer returned with a
cellophane bag. The bag appeared to contain marijuana and
smelled like a rum-soaked cigar. The informer said the packet
came from a larger brown paper bag. Fearful of the possibility of having to break the front door which was an 8 foot sliding glass door, they sent for a sergeant with instruments to pick
the lock. They knocked several times and were not answered
so they picked the lock. s They searched the apartment and
found the occupants had gone out. As they walked through
the house they smelled the same odor that they had smelled
in the package procured by the informer (apparently rumsoaked marijuana).
Then came their fatal mistake. The smell seemed to come
from the closet, the door of which was open. The smell also
seemed to come from a brown paper bag in an open cardboard
box. They discussed getting a search warrant, but rejected
the idea as impracticable at 9 p.m. on a Sunday night. So
they opened the bag and found 21 cellophane packages similar
to the one brought to them by their informant. (The bag and
contents were used as evidence.) They then sat down and
awaited the return of the occupants of the apartment. Some
were arrested, one being the defendant Marshal1. 6
The trial judge thought the evidence was admissible. But
the court of appeal thought the evidence was inadmissible. 7
Three supreme court justices thought the evidence was admissible. However, four supreme court justices thought the
convictions seldom find their way into
appellate reports.
4. 69 CaI.2d - , 69 Cal. Rptr. 585,
442 P.2d 665 (1968).
588
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evidence was improperly seized. The judgment was reversed. Pity the poor peace officers. Their training in the
law is somewhat limited. They act quickly and here
acted quite reasonably. A very masterful job of police work
was ruined.
What went wrong? The officers should have obtained a
search warrant before opening the brown bag. The majority
quotes Johnson v. United StatesS to the effect that inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare
papers and present them to the magistrate are not convincing
reasons to by-pass the warrant requirement.
Now let us follow the process of obtaining a hypothetical
warrant under the facts of Marshall. Fortunately the apartment was located not far from the police station so that little
travel time would be involved. The district attorney in Orange
County ordinarily does not permit peace officers to prepare
warrants largely because most judges will not issue a warrant
which has not been reviewed by a district attorney (and what
district attorney would want it otherwise in view of the technicalities imposed by the appellate courts) . Therefore it would
be necessary to find a deputy district attorney and a' stenographer. According to the district attorney's office:
It is anybody's guess as to how many phone calls
would have been made before finding a deputy at home
and available. Most of the deputies lived in the county
and would have been no farther than 45 minutes driving
time from the Huntington Beach Police Department.
The same procedure would have to be followed to locate
a stenographer and a judge. Under ideal circumstances
during office hours the average search warrant takes
approximately 4 hours to complete. Adding to this the
time required to locate a deputy district attorney who
would in turn have to locate a stenographer and judge,
the estimate of time involved would probably exceed 6
hours.9
8. 333 U.S. 10, 92 L.Ed. 436, 68
S.Ct. 367 (1948).
9. Letter from Michael R. Capizzi,

Deputy District Attorney, Orange
County, dated December 19, 1968 (emphasis added).
CAL LAW 1969
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Just what else would obtaining a search warrant on a Sunday
night entail in Huntington Beach? First of all it would be
necessary to keep two officers guarding the brown bag. Since
they were waiting for several adults to return to the apartment
it would have been dangerous to leave only one man. Thus
a third officer would be needed to do the legwork necessary
to get the warrant. On duty at the time were the watch
commander at the police station, his sergeant, and five other
officers. In other words what the majority is suggesting is
that half of the officers in the field be immobilized. The 12,000
souls of Huntington Beach are to be left at the mercy of
Halloween vandals and other hoodlums with only the "protection" of three policemen. One bad automobile accident
or holdup would immobilize at least two of the three.
Assuming the quest for a warrant began at 10 p.m., the
warrant could be procured no earlier than 4 a.m. Meanwhile,
the occupants of the apartment and friends showed up. At
10:55 p.m. four people showed up. One was arrested as
being the owner of the apartment. Another was arrested as
a juvenile in violation of curfew requirements. Who is to
take them to the police station? This will necessitate the
services of two of the three policemen still on duty in the city
leaving one patrolman to guard the entire city. At 1:30 a.m.,
the defendant and a friend appeared. The defendant was
arrested. The friend was asked and agreed to go to the station for a routine records check. The warrant has not arrived. Once again two of the three policemen on duty must
be used to take the two suspects to the police station. Finally,
the warrant arrives and the two officers guarding the bag of
marijuana are free to return to the station to write up their
reports. lO All of this, the majority of the court refers to as
"inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay!"
10. Officer Hollingsworth who wrote
the reports finished up his stint late
the next afternoon when the Orange
County crime laboratory confirmed that
the contents of the various packets were
marijuana. Whether, after his 24 hour
day, he then went back to his evening
590
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Why must the peace officer go through this ceremonial rite
of procuring a warrant? The majority explains that there is
a difference between probable cause to believe that contraband will be found, which justifies issuance of a search warrant, and observation of contraband in plain sight which justifies search without a warrant. The reason for the difference
is that the magistrate is "neutral and detached" while the
officer may be zealously engaged in "the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime." The majority blinds itself
to the fact that quite a few California magistrates are laymen.
Nor does it allude to the probability of some lack of neutrality
and detachment even by a lawyer-magistrate suddenly awakened at 3: 30 a.m. after a delightful evening of passing out
goodies to trick-or-treaters.
One possibility may be being overlooked by the law enforcement people. The justices of the supreme court are all magistrates. ll It might be interesting for district attorneys who have
supreme court justices in their counties to include them on
the list of magistrates to call in the nighttime to authorize
warrants. Surely, in view of the results in Marshall, at least
four of the justices will be delighted to be awakened at 3:30
a.m. to sign warrants.
One other point made in Marshall is worthy of note. The
majority analogized looking into the brown bag with the
search made in Bielicki v. Superior Court.12 In Bielicki the
officers looked down through a hole above toilets in a private
amusement park and caught the defendants violating Penal
Code section 286. The peeping was held to constitute an
illegal search and seizure. Even if you find the brown bag, you
must not peep without a warrant. Furthermore, merely because you smell something which in all probability is marijuana in the bag, you must wait until you explain the whole
thing to a magistrate. Of course, the magistrate will not be
able to smell the bag, but because of his neutrality and detachment, he will be able to quiz you to find out if you were correct
in your olifactory findings. The majority quips: "'In plain
11. Penal Code § 808.

12. 57 Cal.2d 602, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552,
371 P.2d 288 (1962).
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smell,' . . . is plainly not the equivalent of 'in plain view.' "
An officer properly on the premises can seize something he sees
without the rubber stamp of the magistrate. His sense of
smell must be reviewed by the magistrate.
Miranda 13 problems, as might be expected, continued to
arise. Perhaps the most outrageous decision was that in
People v. Fioritto. 14 Defendant and two others burglarized
a market. He was captured and brought into the police station
and administered the standard Miranda warnings (or as Jack
Webb's TV program puts it "given his rights"). However, he
refused to sign a waiver of his rights. Thereafter he was confronted by his juvenile accomplices both of whom had confessed and implicated him. The accomplices after some discussion were taken out. Defendant again was advised of his
rights and asked if he would like to sign the waiver. He then
signed the waiver and confessed.
The supreme court in a 5-2 decision held that by refusing
to waive his rights initially, the privilege was invoked. Once
invoked all further attempts at police interrogation should
have ceased. One more obstacle was placed in the way of law
enforcement. The court threw a small crumb to the peace
officers when it declared, citing People v. Tomita,1s that where
the defendant after asserting his constitutional rights thereafter initiates a confession, his voluntary statements can be
utilized.
Justice Burke, dissenting, relied on the purpose of Miranda
which is the prevention of in-custody interrogation without
advice of constitutional rights. He noted that in Miranda
and companion cases no full and effective warning was
given before interrogation. Here there were two warnings
and a signed waiver. Furthermore, the defendant was a
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). An interesting recent U.S. Supreme Court case
is Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S.
1, 20 L.Ed.2d 381, 88 S.Ct. 1503
(1968), where the court held that "custody" for the purposes of Miranda includes custody for an unrelated of592
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fense. Defendant was questioned while
in a state jail by a federal tax agent in
the course of investigation of his civil
tax liability.
14. 68 Cal.2d 714, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817,
441 P.2d 625 (1968).
15. 260 Cal.App.2d 88, 66 Cal. Rptr.
739 (1968).
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parolee "somewhat sophisticated in the field of law enforcement." Justice Burke thought that the notion that a voluntary
statement must be initiated by the defendant is a novel interpretation of Miranda.
The court of appeal decisions in the Miranda area seem generally to show more awareness of the problems of law enforcement than do those of the supreme courts. For example, in
People v. Merchant,16 peace officers had a tip that defendant,
an ex-convict, possessed a forbidden weapon. They talked to
him through a locked screen door asking whether he was an
ex-convict and whether he possessed a weapon which would
be forbidden to an ex-convict under Penal Code section 12021.
He answered both questions in the affirmative. The court
held that he was not in custody and that the Miranda warnings
did not have to be given at that point.
A similar common sense result attained in People v. Sievers.17
In that case the defendant was apprehended at Arizona by
FBI agents and given Miranda warnings. The next day he
was questioned by a San Francisco policeman who did not
so warn him. He made admissions which were used against
him in evidence. The court, in dictum, declared that no more
than one adequate warning need be given by a person who
may be subject to successive interrogation. IS
At the rate things are going, the time will probably come
when peace officers will have to advise persons committing
crimes in their presence of their constitutional rights. Fortunately, that time has not yet arrived. A police officer in
plain clothes observed the attempt of a bartender to close his
bar at 2 a.m. The defendant was in the doorway trying to
embrace the bartender. As she left the bar she approached
the officer and asked if he would like to go to a sex party
where there would also be "pot." He went with her to her
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16. 260 Cal. App.2d 875, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 459 (1968).
17. 255 Cal. App.2d 34, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1967).
18. It is not clear whether the FBI
agents asked any questions or whether
he declined to discuss his case with
38

I
I

I
I

them. If so, the later Supreme Court
decision in Fioritto would have come
into play. Furthermore, the decision
may be inconsistent with People v.
Kelley, 66 Cal.2d 232, 57 Cal. Rptr.
363, 424 P.2d 947 (1967) discussed in
Cal. Law 1967, at p. 377.
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apartment. Another officer followed and was also invited in.
To make a long story short she collected marijuana cigarettes
in her apartment and started away with the officers in an
unmarked police car. When she started to smoke a "joint"
she was arrested and advised of her rights at which time she
produced other marijuana from her purse. She claimed that
the act of smoking the marijuana while in "custody" was an
admission and that she should earlier have been advised of
her Miranda rights. By way of dictum the court said that
smoking the marijuana was not an admission or confession
but the criminal act itself. Under such circumstances Miranda
warnings are not required. 19
In People v. Cheatham 20 the court felt it necessary to state
that a non-peace officer who makes a citizen's arrest need
not advise the arrestee of his Miranda rights.
A recurring as well as a troublesome problem raised by
Miranda and its ilk, is the problem of driving while under the
influence of an intoxicating beverage. Ent v. Department of
Motor Vehicles 1 is illustrative. Ent, an attorney, was arrested
for driving while under the influence. She declined to submit
to a chemical test of her blood, breath or urine as required
by Vehicle Code section 13353. She demanded that an attorney be present during the test. No test was ever made. In
accordance with the statute the department suspended her
operator's license for 6 months. The superior court granted
a writ of mandate which ordered the setting aside of the suspension. She contended that her refusal to take the test was
not a refusal but a request to delay until her counsel could be
present. The court of appeal rejected her contention relying
on various decisions including People v. Sudduth. 2 It also
pointed to the well known fact that the probative value of a
19. People v. Marinos, 260 Cal. App.
2d 735, 67 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1968).
20. 263 Cal. App.2d - , 69 Cal. Rptr.
679 (1968).
1. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
726 (1968).
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2. 65 Cal.2d 543, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393,
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421 P.2d 401 (1966), cert. den. 389 U.S.
850, 19 L.Ed.2d 119, 88 S.Ct. 43, discussed in Cal. Law 1967, at p. 393.
The court in Sudduth held: "Suspects
have no constitutional right to refuse
a test designed to produce physical evidence in the form of a breath sample
whether or not counsel is present."
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chemical test for intoxication diminishes with the passage of
time. She also made a rather outlandish contention that the
officer should give her some warning analogous to the Miranda
warnings to the effect that she had no right to counsel at
the time of the test. 3 This also was rejected. The peace
officers can't lose them all!
The problem of required formalities for arrest continues
to arise. People v. Rosales4 represents a significant limitation on the exceptions to the requirement that the formalities
of Penal Code section 844 be complied with before making
an arrest without a warrant. Section 844 requires that the
officers demand admittance and announce the purpose for
which it is desired before breaking in. The arrest, which
took place at night was for parole violation. A possible
escape attempt was anticipated since the defendant had
absconded before. There was also a fear that defendant
and his confederate, also a parole violator, would resist arrest.
The officers identified themselves to a girl visible through
the open door before they moved in and arrested defendant
with heroin on his person. In another of the familiar 7-4
decisions (seven if you count the trial judge, the court of
appeal and the three dissenting judges), a slim majority
reversed a conviction for possession of heroin.
Fortunately the basis for the majority decision was section
844, not the Constitution, although the majority did note
that the section is designed to protect fundamental rights.
"Even an escape from custody . . . does not alone justify
entrance into a house" without compliance with the section.
The majority relies on Miller v. United Statel which up to
now would have been deemed irrelevant in California because
that case was based on an interpretation of a federal statute.
The least that can be said for Rosales is that it represents
3. She relied upon People v Ellis, 65
Cal.2d 529, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d
393 (1966), discussed in Trends and Developments 1967, at p. 394, which was
distinguished by the court.
4. 68 Ca1.2d 299, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1,
437 P.2d 489 (1968).

S. 357 U.S. 301, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332, 78
S.Ct. 1190 (1958). A more recent decision is Sabbath v. United States, 391
U.S. 585, 20 L.Ed.2d 828, 88 S.Ct.
1755 (1968).
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another tightening of the thumbscrews on good police work.
However, it also may be a bellweather for further restrictions
in this area. Once again the majority of the court find
themselves in a race to anticipate the United States Supreme
Court and thereby makes themselves the leaders in "progressive" criminal procedural developments. 6
Perhaps the result in People v. Gastelo7 makes more sense.
This was a search warrant entry and the problem arose under
Penal Code section 1531 which is similar to section 844,
and treated as analogous by the court. Here there was a
forced entry without any attempt to comply with the section
at 8: 20 a.m. on a Saturday morning, the day after Christmas.
The defendant and one Donna Grujillo were asleep in the
bedroom at that time. The Attorney General, according to
the court, contended that unannounced forcible entry is always
reasonable to execute a search warrant in narcotics cases.
This contention was rejected by a unanimous court.
In the Marshall case already noted 8 the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendants in their apartment. The
arrest was postponed briefly because of a dangerous glass
door which the officers feared they might have to break
through. Therefore they sent for an expert to pick the lock
if necessary. They knocked several times and announced
their identity. There was no response so the lock was picked
and entry made. The court felt that this was substantial
compliance with Penal Code section 844. This part of the
decision seems far more sensible than Rosales.
The problem of how much subterfuge can be employed
by officers has occasionally troubled our supreme court sometimes with absurd results. For example, in People v. Reeves,9
an anonymous informer told police that the defendant, a
narcotics loser, had heroin and was staying at the St. George
Hotel. One of the officers knew defendant had a prior conviction. They got him to open the door of his room on the
6. Cf. Cal Law Trends and Del'elopments 1967, p. 367.
7. 67 Cal.2d 586, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10,
432 P.2d 706 (1967).
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8. People v. Marshall, 69 Cal.2d - ,
69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 442 P.2d 665 (1968).
9. 61 Cal.2d 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. 1,
391 P.2d 393 (1964).
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ruse that there was a registered letter for him. They saw
what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette, made the arrest
and searched and seized other marijuana. This was held
to be an illegal arrest, search, and seizure because of the
ruse which was thought to amount to illegal "trickery, stealth
or subterfuge." Seemingly, fighting crime is more like participating in a boxing match than a war. The Marquis of
Queensberry rules are in force. Officers must use gloves of
the proper weight and never hurt the criminal too much.
Peace officers must always be perfect gentlemen in their dealings with hoodlums.
In People v. Coleman,lo a more sensible result was reached.
There was an arrest warrant for possession by the defendant
of marijuana. The assistant manager of the hotel where
defendant resided told the desk clerk to take the peace officers
to defendant's room. The desk clerk took them to the room,
rapped on the door, and said that it was the desk clerk without
prompting by the officers. The defendant opened the door,
was arrested and large quantities of narcotics seized. The
court very carefully distinguished Reeves as a case where
there was no warrant and not even probable cause. The
court felt that the conduct of the officers was proper even
if there had been subterfuge to get in the room as contended
by the defendant.
Two important arrest warrant decisions were handed down
this year. At least since 1872 it has been customary in drafting complaints to "track" or follow the words of the statute.
Penal Code section 952 authorizes this. Section 813 provides
that if the magistrate is satisfied "from the complaint that
the offense complained of has been committed and that there
is reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed it" he must issue an arrest warrant. The United States
Supreme Court in Giordenello v. United Statesll held that a
complaint which merely states the affiant's conclusions in the
words of the statute cannot support a valid arrest warrant.
This was stated to be applicable to the states in Aguilar v.
10. 263 Cal. App.2d - , 69 Cal. Rptr.
910 (1968).
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Texas. 12 It was a foregone and predictable18 conclusion that
when faced with the question, the California Supreme Court
would hold that the customary practice in California of merely
stating the words of the statute is unconstitutional. This it
did in People v. Sesslin.14 A complaint must state facts to
support the complainant's belief that the defendant committed
the alleged felony. Furthermore, if it is based on information
and belief, as is quite common, it must show facts relative
to the identity or credibility of the source of such information
and belief.
This result was not reached without the dissent of three
justices. They pointed out that Giordenello was based on a
federal rule. This is true but a footnote in Aguilar makes it
clear that Giordenello is applicable to the states under the
14th Amendment. They also suggest that magistrates often
informally interrogate the complainant at length. However,
one may doubt that they always do this. For once, I have
to side with the majority which seems bound by Giordenello
and Aguilar.
What are the implications of Sesslin? There seems no reason to apply it only to felonies. Penal Code section 1427
provides that if the magistrate is presented with a misdemeanor
complaint and "is satisfied therefrom that the offense complained of has been committed, and that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the defendant has committed it" he
must issue a warrant for the arrest of the defendant. Once
again the time honored practice with misdemeanor complaints
is to track the statute. Doubtless at least some magistrates
take their morning stack of complaints and warrants and sign
them without even reading them. In any event in very few
cases can they satisfy themselves "therefrom." There is insufficient information.
12. 378 U.S. 108 at 112 fn. 3, 12
L.Ed.2d 723 at 727, 84 S.Ct. 1509 at
- (1964).
13. Collings, Toward Workable Rules
of Search and Seizure-An Amicus
Curiae Brief, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 421, 455
(1962).
598
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14. 68 Ca1.2d 418, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409,
439 P.2d 321 (1968). For further discussion of this case see Harvey, EVIDENCE, in this volume.
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What will be the effect of Sesslin? I suggested in an earlier
article 15 and again suggest that one may doubt that many magistrates will intensify their perusal of complaints before issuing
warrants. Prosecutors and others will be forced to be more
careful in preparation of complaints. They will do more
than repeat the statutory language especially where the basis
of the complaint is information and belief.
It would be a pity to stop using the short-form complaint.
Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was
amended as a result of Giordenello to provide that it must
appear from the complaint, "or from an affidavit or affidavits
filed with the complaint" that there is probable cause. Such
a solution should be acceptable to the California courts even
in the absence of an amendment of the statute.
The number of consent to search cases reported each year
since Cahan ranges between 10 and 15. The trend continues
toward restricting peace officers in this area. The most
important decision of the past year was another of the 4-3
decisions in People v. Johnson. I6 There the peace officers
had reliable information that one Cooper was selling narcotics at a named hotel. They went to the hotel and as they
approached Cooper's room he came out and was questioned.
He was searched without any narcotics being found. Cooper,
when asked if his room could be searched, gave the officers
the key to the room. They entered and found defendant in
possession of narcotics. The majority held that the search
of Cooper was unlawful because information from an informer
could not be used to show probable cause as the officers
declined to name him. "The succeeding events were so intimately connected with the officers' unlawful conduct that the
evidence acquired must be held to be the result of that
conduct." The majority declined to apply retroactively section 1042 (c) of the Evidence Code which authorizes protection of the informer's identity, the principle of which was
15. Collings, Toward Workable Rules
of Search and Seizure-An Amicus
Curiae Brief, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 421, 455
(1962).
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440 P.2d 921 (1968).
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upheld in McCray v. Illinois. 17 In any event the majority
felt that there was insufficient showing of the underlying
circumstances which showed the informer to be reliable.
The dissent pointed out that the defense never relied at the
trial on unlawful search of Cooper, nor was the matter
argued on appeal. In any event the dissenters could see no
illegal activity on the part of the officers. There was no
overbearing conduct by the two officers. Cooper was not
even arrested. 18
In People v. Chimel/ 9 officers armed with Sesslin-type warrants were more successful. However, although the warrants
were constitutionally insufficient, the prosecution sought in
the trial court to justify the arrest independently of the warrant. The trial court found that there was probable cause
based on the information the officer had at the time of the
arrest. The supreme court affirmed with only Justice Peters
dissenting. Thus, if there is any possibility that the warrant
may be insufficient, the prosecutor still may be able to sustain
a conviction if he shows in the trial court that the arresting
officers had probable cause to make the arrest.
The problem of seizure of contraband discovered in an
inventory of the contents of a motor vehicle arose this year
in the context of two automobile accidents where the defendants had been disabled and hospitalized. In both cases the
searches and seizures were upheld. 20
The problem of a computer generated warrant arose in
17. 386 U.S. 300, 18 L.Ed.2d 62, 87
S.Ct. 1056 (1967).
18. Other interesting consent cases
include: People v. Linke, 265 Cal.
App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1968)
(wife's consent); People v. Cruz, 264
Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr. 249
(1968) (shoulder shrugging); Pierce v.
Board of Nursing Education & Nurse
Registration, 255 Cal. App.2d 463, 63
Cal. Rptr. 107 (1967) (female nurse
living with male nurse on probation);
People v. Lobikis, 256 Cal. App.2d 775,
600
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64 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1967) (common
law wife); Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 88 S.Ct.
1788 (1968) (grandmother owned home
searched and rifle seized).
19. 68 Cal.2d 436, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421,
439 P;2d 333 (1968).
20. People v. Roth, 261 Cal. App.2d
430, 68 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1968); People v.
Norris, 262 Cal. App.2d - , 68 Cal.
Rptr. 582 (1968); cf. discussion in Cal
Law Trends and Developments 1967,
at p. 371.
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People v. Superior Court. 1 The defendant was cited for a
traffic violation. He violated his promise to appear and the
computer generated the warrant. A clerk affixed the magistrate's facsimile signature and attached an IBM bail card.
The magistrate never saw it. The peace officer was suspicious
of a parked car and checked it out via radio and discovered
the existence of the warrant. He also found narcotics. The
superior court granted a motion to suppress under the new
Penal Code section 1538.5 on the ground of the failure of
the warrant to satisfy Penal Code sections 813 and 815. 2
The court of appeal granted a writ of prohibition to the prosecutor, holding that there is no requirement that the magistrate
make a section 813 determination of probable cause. The
offense, failure to appear, occurred in his presence. The
magistrate ordered a warrant issued at the time of the nonappearance. There is no requirement, said the court, either
in Vehicle Code section 40514 or Penal Code section 853.8
(failure to appear) that the magistrate actually sign the
warrant. 3
Pre-trial right to counsel. The case of In re Hawley 4
involves the problem of a plea bargain well handled by all
concerned. The defendant after quite a bit too much to drink
beat another man and set the building afire. He was charged
with murder and arson. The autopsy revealed that the fire
rather than the beating caused the death. He was examined by
two psychiatrists who came up with conflicting reports. One
thought he was mentally ill, as well as so drunk as not to
know right from wrong. The other thought he was quite
sane. The public defender entered into an agreement with
the prosecution to the effect that the defendant would plead
to first degree murder if the prosecutor would dismiss the
1. 262 Cal. App.2d 283, 68 Cal. Rptr.
629 (1968).
2. It would appear that the applicable section is § 1427.
3. The court relies on the fact that
the clerk's docket entry at the time of
the nonappearance indicates that the
magistrate ordered a warrant. What
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is there behind that statement? Did
the clerk place before the magistrate
one, five or fifty files relative to failure
to appear. Did the magistrate read
them all before ordering issuance of
warrants? Should he have to?
4. 67 Cal.2d 824, 63 Cal. Rptr. 831,
433 P.2d 919 (1967).
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arson charge and recommend life imprisonment. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. On habeas
corpus he claimed that the above facts showed lack of effective
representation by counsel, relying on People v. Ibarra. 5 Although Ibarra involved representation at a trial, the court
thought the same principles apply to pretrial representation.
However, the court felt that incompetence could not be shown.
In view of the conflicting facts on the issue of diminished
responsibility, the gruesome nature of the evidence, and admitted conduct which showed some evidence of premeditation
and malice, there was a significant possibility of a death
penalty had trial been held and the decision to plead to first
degree murder with a life sentence was proper.
The importance of full advice of right to counsel as well
as full docket entries cannot be emphasized too much. In
People v. Harris,6 the docket sheet relates that defendant
requested counsel, but fails to show that he was advised of
his right to appear with counselor, if indigent, to have appointed counsel. If he appeared without counsel the record
should contain sufficient facts to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. Fortunately, in the case of Harris
the defects were waived by his failure to object to them in
a Penal Code section 995 motion.
Grand jury. A superior court judge denied newspapers
access to grand jury transcripts after the defendants were
taken into custody. His apparent reasoning was that he
had to insure a fair trial. The United States Supreme Court
has gone over backward to prevent pUblicity from interfering
with fair triaP Although it shows some awareness of the
need for discovery by the defendant it has still been inclined
to protect the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. 8 Cali5. 60 Cal.2d 460, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863,
386 P.2d 487 (1963).
6. 67 Cal.2d 866, 64 Cal. Rptr. 313,
434 P.2d 609 (1967), app. dismd. 391
U.S. 603, 20 L.Ed.2d 848, 88 S.Ct.
1867; see also, In re Wells, 67 Cal.2d
873, 64 Cal. Rptr. 317, 434 P.2d 613
(1967), as well as In re Smiley, 66
Cal.2d 606, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 427 P.2d
602
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179 (1967) and the discussion in Cal
Law Trends and Developments 1967
at p. 382.
7. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 14 L.Ed.2d 543, 85 S Ct 1628
(1965).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,2 L.Ed.2d
1077, 78 S.Ct. 983 (1958); see, also,
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fornia, on the other hand, has gone the other way and given
the defendant a right to the transcript of the grand jury
proceedings which lead to his indictment. 9 How do you solve
the dilemma? The court of appeal in Craemer v. Superior
Court lO resolved it in favor of pUblicity. However, the defendant would have a reasonable time after receipt of the
transcript to object to disclosure of inadmissible matter.
Pre-trial motions. ll There have been a number of decisions
on various aspects of the operation of the new motion to suppress procedure, section 1538.5. They do not appear worthy
of mention here and can casily be found by standard research
techniques. From a reading of these decisions it appears that
the new procedure is off to a satisfactory beginning.
Maine v. Superior Court12 involves the problem of change
in venue where there is a combination of an atrocious crime,
considerable publicity in a fairly small county, and the fact
that the defendants were strangers to the country. Maine
and Braun kidnapped a young couple, murdered the boy,
raped the girl, beat her until they apparently thought she
was dead, then hurled her body over a cliff. They were
charged with murder, rape, kidnapping, and assault with intent
to commit murder. They moved under Penal Code section
1033 for a change of venue on the ground that a fair and
impartial trial could not be had in Mendocino County (population 51,000). The trial court denied the motion. The
defendants sought a writ of mandate to direct a change of
venue.
Preliminarily the supreme court had to determine whether
mandate would lie to compel a change of venue. The court
Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule oj Secrecy, 48 Va. L.
Rev. 668 (1962).
9. Penal Code § 938.1.
10. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal.
Rptr. 193 (1968).
11. See, Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.C!.
1620 (1968), relative to the problem of
joinder of two defendants where one
has confessed.
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In Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293,
20 L.Ed.2d 1100, 88 S.Ct. 1921 (1968),
the court held that the Bruton rule is
applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, the
Bruton rule must be applied retroactively.
12. 68 Cal.2d 375, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724,
438 P.2d 372 (1968).
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after lengthy discussion and noting that mandate had not
been employed previously in this situation upheld its use. It
weighed the problem of protecting the right to a fair trial
against the burdens of going through a trial and raising the
issue on appeal. By way of dictum it suggests that the application for mandate should be made in advance of the trial
not during or after impaneling the jury. A motion for change
of venue can still be made at those stages of the procedure
and error on appeal predicated on denial of such motions.
The court noted that mandate normally lies to control
abuses rather than exercises of discretion. But in the case
of this new use of mandate, Sheppard v. MaxweZ[13 requires
the court to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances and satisfy itself that the defendant obtains a fair and
impartial trial.
The court then proceeded to evaluate the circumstances
and ruled unanimously that venue should be changed probably to a metropolitan county. There were other circumstances mentioned by the court in addition to the facts earlier
set forth. The victims were a popular teen-age couple from
respected families. A fund had been established to defray
the girl's medical expenses and a local paper was urging all
to contribute. A large fund was raised mostly from modest
contributions. Although the sheriff and district attorney had
been "extremely close-mouthed," others, including a state of
Washington official (the defendants also committed crimes in
that state), had revealed the fact that one defendant had
confessed. The district attorney had disqualified the trial
judge whom one defense counsel was opposing for re-election.
Hopefully, the court will be sparing in its use of mandate
in such cases. Maine and Braun were tried in San Jose, some
170 odd miles from Ukiah, the Mendocino County seat. The
prosecutor and his assistants and defense counsel (I believe
they were court appointed) must be transported to San Jose
and paid per diem while there. The same is true of the witnesses. The prosecutor's operations suffer by his absence. No

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/22

13. 384 U.s. 333, 16 L.Ed.2d 600,
86 s.Ct. 1507 (1966).
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doubt he spends his evenings trying to prepare his case for
the next day and answering long distance phone calls from
his office. He spends his weekends back in Ukiah. But after
all there are 168 hours in a week.
A stalling ploy often resorted to by the sophisticated con
is a last minute decision to discharge his court appointed
counsel and go ahead on his own. He asks for a continuance
and when the case is called for trial, he may later "realize"
his inadequacies and asks that counsel again be appointed and
for another continuance. Perhaps the food is better in county
jails than in San Quentin. Who knows? If the motion is
granted, the sixty or so persons on the jury panel have to be
sent home.
In People v. Maddox 14 the defendant repeatedly asked that
he be permitted to represent himself. On more than one
occasion his appointed counsel, the public defender, also asked
to be relieved. The motions were denied on the last occasion
with the prospective jurors sitting in the court room. The
trial judge excused the public defender and proceeded with
the trial despite defendant's claim that he was not ready
because he had insufficient opportunity to use the law library
and subpoena witnesses. He declined to state what would
be the testimony of the witnesses he desired to subpoena.
The court thereupon commenced to impanel the jury and
denied a motion for a continuance of 60 days. The trial
proceeded and defendant was convicted of the crimes charged
-battery and attempted escape. The supreme court allowed
itself to be suckered into a reversal on the ground that the
trial judge should have granted a continuance to give the
defendant time to prepare his case for trial. Only Justice
McComb dissented.
What is a proper solution of this problem? The defendant
is informed in the inferior court of his right to counsel. He
is again informed of this right when he comes before the
superior court. Perhaps he should also be informed that
he not only has a right to proceed with or without counsel,
14. 67 Cal.2d 647, 63 Cal. Rptr. 371,
433 P.2d 163 (1967).
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but that if he elects to proceed with counsel, without good
cause being shown, he will not be granted a continuance if
he later elects to proceed without counsel. Isn't it about time
that the courts cease letting the con-wise make monkeys out
of them?
Trial preparation. A perennial problem is the procuring
of foreign, that is, out of state, witnesses. The Uniform Act
to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from without the State
in Criminal Cases (Penal Code sections 1334-1334.6) has
been in force since 1937. It has its problems. However
you obtain a foreign witness, it is expensive and will affect
the budget. When must the court call him? When can it
get along with his testimony at the preliminary examination,
etc.?
A rare case came before the supreme court this year. In
People v. Cavanaugh 15 the defense was alibi, that the defendant was in Boston at the time of the crime. The defendant
wanted to bring eleven witnesses from Massachusetts to testify
to his alibi. The trial judge ruled that the number of witnesses
was out of proportion to realities and asked reconsideration.
Defense counsel was permitted to submit written interrogatories to the witnesses, who were examined by the Boston
public defender. Defense counsel then moved that four witnesses be brought from Massachusetts. The trial judge
announced he would allow two witnesses to be brought. Counsel selected two and testimony of others was read to the jury.
The court, recognizing an equal protection issue, held that
its problem was primarily one of determining whether the
trial judge properly exercised his discretion. After noting
that the testimony of the absent witnesses, was either vague
or cumulative, held that the trial judge had properly exercised
his discretion.
Another decision under the Uniform Act is also worthy of
note. In People v. WOOdS 16 the court noted that under Evi15. 69 Cal.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr. 438,
444 P.2d 110 (1968).
16. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal.
Rptr. 583 (1968); see also, Barber v.
606
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Page, 390 U.S. 719, 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 88
S.C!. 1318 (1968). In Barber v. Page,
the Court, after noting that it is often
possible to procure the attendance of
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dence Code section 1291(a), the fact that a witness is out
of the state is not enough to make his former testimony (here
a preliminary transcript) admissible since his testimony can
be compelled by process. However, the defendant did not
object to the use of the transcript and therefore waived any
rights to have its use reviewed on appeal.
Whether criminal discovery belongs here I do not know.
However, two important cases should be mentioned somewhere. 17 People v. Russel/ 8 involved the Ballard19 problem.
Defendant was charged with violations of Penal Code sections
285 (incest) and 288, the alleged victim being his daughter.
After a mistrial because of failure of the jury to reach a verdict,
the defendant was granted an order that the child be examined by a psychiatrist to determine whether her mental or
emotional condition affected her veracity. Apparently the
psychiatrist talked to her for 20 minutes. 2o The trial judge
in the second trial declined to admit the "evidence." The
supreme court felt that the record did not sufficiently show
the basis for the trial judge's exercise of his discretion and
therefore it resolved that question in favor of the defendant.
Ballard, it said, requires liberal exercise of discretion in such
cases in favor of the defendant. Failure of the trial judge
to state his reasons for his ruling requires reversal. (All one
has to do to understand his reasons is to read the report.)
Hopefully, the prosecutor will try again. The still unanswered
question is who is going to analyze the psychiatrists, who
under decisions like Russel, Ballard, and the diminished responsibility cases, unquestionably invade the province of the
jury?
In People v. Garcia/ the supreme court by another of its
out-of-state witnesses under modern
procedures, stated that mere absence of
a witness is insufficient ground for using his preliminary testimony at the trial
unless the prosecutor has made a goodfaith effort to obtain his presence.
17. See also, Smith v. Illinois, 390
U.S. 129, 19 L.Ed.2d 956, 88 S.Ct. 748
(1968), relative to discovery of the
name of an informer.
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18. 69 Cal.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr. 210,
443 P.2d 794 (1968).
19. Ballard v. Superior Court, 64
Ca1.2d 159, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d
838, 18 A.L.R.3d 1416 (1966).
20. His brief report is quoted in note
7 of the opinion.

1. 67 Ca1.2d 830, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110,
434 P.2d 366 (1967).
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4-3 decisions, actually by dictum, gutted Evidence Code
section 1042 (c). The informants in a narcotics case according to the majority were not participants or eyewitnesses.
However, there was a "possibility" that they might support
defendant's case. The majority's speculation as to these
"possibilities" must be read to be believed. The test is whether
their evidence "might" result in exoneration of the defendants.
If there is a "possibility" that the informer's evidence "might"
help the defendant, disclose his name. The very strong "possibility" that he "might" be murdered is not worthy of consideration. These informers did not participate in or witness
the transaction. They were not present when the evidence
was seized and the arrest was made. They made no accusation against the defendant, but only against individuals involving premises not under control of the defendant. In fact
there is no evidence that they knew or had ever heard of the
defendant. Once again I suggest that the majority has gutted
section 1042 ( c). It is predictable that the majority will
frustrate other sections of the Evidence Code before it is
through. 2
Trial

This article will not discuss recent United
States Supreme Court developments in trial by jury problems.
Trial by jury.3

2. Cf. People v. Johnson, 68 Cal.2d
646, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599, 441 P.2d 111
(1968).
3. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 88 S.Ct. 1444
(1968). When is there a right to trial
by jury in minor crimes? Recent legislation in California creates an offense known as an infraction. Penal
Code § 19c. A person charged with
an infraction is not entitled to a right
to trial by jury. This would appear to
be constitutional under Duncan.
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 20
L.Ed.2d 522, 88 S.Ct. 1477 (1968).
When is there a right to trial by jury
for "criminal" contempts? What is a
criminal contempt? See also, Dyke v.
608
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Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S.
216, 20 L.Ed.2d 538, 88 S.Ct. 1472
(1968).
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770
(1968). When can a prospective member of a jury in capital case be excused
who is opposed to the death penalty?
Implications of Witherspoon are tremendous. Can you challenge them peremptorilY? Can you challenge "Mexicans" when the defendant is Mexican?
Can you challenge "Italians" when the
defendant is Italian? Can you challenge naturalized citizens when the defendant is naturalized and the case involves immigration matters?
The
Court in Witherspoon just did not think
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These will no doubt be in the forefront next year. The decisions are cited in the notes, however. Perhaps it is worthy
of note that the Supreme Court of California decided in
People v. Harris,4 that the contention of an atheist that he
should be allowed to exclude all jurors who believe in God
is devoid of merit.
Public trial. Decisions involving the right to public trial
are rare but always interesting when they arise. One problem
is to whom does the right to a public trial belong-defendant,
prosecutor, public or press? Can the defendant request, without objection of the prosecutor, closed proceedings to keep
out the public and the press? Oxnard Publishing Co. v.
Superior Coud involved a number of very peculiar circumstances. For example the court on request of the public
defender prevented the prosecutor from commenting on witnesses at a lineup in his opening statement. The judge in
closed session heard all sorts of testimony (30 witnesses),
visited the scene of the crime, and heard psychiatrist testimony over a seven week period. A table listing the numerous
closed hearings is included in the opinion. In any event the
appellate court ordered the trial judge to vacate his closing
order. The decision is a useful summary of the law in this
area, even if the facts set forth are rather unsatisfactory.
Competent counsel. Does a trial judge have the right to
remove incompetent counsel over the objection of the defendant? This was the issue in Smith v. Superior Court. 6 The
trial judge relieved court appointed counsel in a murder case.
The defendant objected and stated that he demanded that
attorney and no other. The supreme court upheld this right.
Admission to the bar establishes that the State deems an
attorney competent to undertake the practice of law before
all of the courts. The only court capable of action otherwise
the problem through and came down
with a very bad decision. It all goes to
show that the Court is an inadequate
legislature. See, also, Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 20 L.Ed.2d
797, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (1968).
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4. 67 Cal.2d 866, 64 Cal. Rptr. 313,
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434 P.2d 609 (1967), app. dismd. 391
U.S. 603, 20 L.Ed.2d 848, 88 S.Ct.
1867.
5. 68 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1968), hearing
granted, dismissed.
6. 68 Ca1.2d 547, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1,
440 P.2d 65 (1968).
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is the supreme court. If the attorney is making mistakes to
the prejudice of the client who wants him anyway, the judge's
only remedy, if any, is to hold him in contempt. Query
whether an attorney could be punished for contempt for his
incompetence if unintentiona1. 7
Trial testimony. The practice in Southern California of
trying a case on the record of the preliminary hearing has
its advantages-but may also be a booby trap. In People v.
Wheeler,s the trial went like this:
In the superior court defendant was represented by
private counsel. On June 20, 1966, defendant, in person, waived his right to a jury trial. Counsel joined in
the waiver. The prosecutor and defense counsel then
entered a stipulation to submit the matter on the transcript of the preliminary hearing, subject to the right
of both sides to call additional witnesses. Defendant did
not personally participate in the stipulation or affirmatively indicate his assent thereto.
The case came on for trial on June 30, 1966. The
following is a complete copy of the transcript of the proceedings: "THE COURT: People versus Wheeler. Let
the record show that the Court has read the entire transcript of the preliminary hearing in this case and has
examined the exhibits. MR. LEWIS: The People rest.
THE CLERK: Was there a submission here? THE
COURT: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The defense
rests, your Honor. THE COURT: Do you want to
argue it? MR. LEWIS: The People will submit the matter. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The defense submits the
matter, your Honor. THE COURT: I find the defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, a lesser and
necessarily included offense than that charged in the
Information, assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to commit murder. THE DEFENDANT: What! [DE7. See Lyons v. Superior Court, 43
Cal.2d 755, 278 P.2d 681 (1955), cert.
den. 350 U.S. 876, 100 L.Ed. 774, 76
S.Ct. 121.
610
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8. 260 Cal. App.2d 522, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 246 (1968).
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FENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, the defendant waives
time for sentence and requests leave of Court to file a
written application for probation. THE COURT: The
matter will be referred to the Probation Department.
It will be set for hearing on probation and sentence on
July 21st at 9: 30. The defendant is remanded to the
custody of the Sheriff pending further hearing. THE
DEFENDANT: You mean I have been tried? THE
COURT: Certainly. You just got tried and were found
guilty. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: A.D.W. THE DEFENDANT: Wait a minute. I haven't said a word.
THE COURT: Take him out of here. THE DEFENDANT: What is this? THE COURT: Wait a minute.
Come here. This case was submitted on the transcript
by your counsel. At the last hearing it was submitted
on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing and I have read the transcript, and on the
basis of the testimony there I found you guilty, so you
have had a trial. What are you complaining about?
THE DEFENDANT: I haven't said a word. THE
COURT: You don't have to say a word. Your counsel
didn't put you on. You don't have to say anything.
THE DEFENDANT: What did I pay him for? THE
COURT: I don't know. Take him out. [DEFENSE
COUNSEL]: Thank you."
Needless to say the judgment was reversed.
Comment and instructions. Despite Griffin v. 'r;alifornia 9
the problem of comment on the failure of the accused to
testify will continue. Aside from the fact that every jury has
at least one person on it who knows the implications of failure
to testify and will raise them, there are other problems.
In People v. Hernandez 10 the prosecutor asked for and the
trial judge gave CALJIC 51 which instructs the jury not to
draw an inference of guilt from the failure of the defendant
to testify and not to discuss this in the jury room. Must this
instruction be given at the request of the defendant, at the
9. 380 U.S. 609, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85
S.Ct. 1229 (1965).

10. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr.
330 (1968).
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request of the prosecutor, or sua sponte? Hernandez includes
numerous citations. Doubtless the matter will be taken up
by the supreme court. The Hernandez court solved the problem by saying that it was error to give the instruction, but not
reversible error.
In People v. McClellan,ll the court stated the Griffin problem just about as well as it could possibly be stated. It said:
"
the judgments against McClellan and Ford, two
murderers, must now be reversed because the supreme court
changed the rules after the case was tried." Palmer, their
victim, won't mind. He is dead.
Some of the Griffin opinions are way off base. For example, in People v. Summerfield/ 2 the court gave a modified
version of CALJIC 235 to the effect that evidence that a
person in possession of stolen property soon after it was taken
who has a reasonable opportunity to explain his possession
may tend to show his guilt by not making an explanation.
This is an obvious truth, but the jury must never be told this,
at least if his appeal goes to the Court of Appeal, Second
District, Division Three. Judge Frampton sitting pro tern.
dissented.
What are we going to do about CALJIC anyway? Some
district attorneys treat it as gospel and provide ample copies
for all to use. Others arbitrarily refuse to use it preferring
their own boiler plate. CALJIC is used all over the country.
It is now prepared by a committee of judges in Los Angeles
county. Should it be completely revised? Should it be turned
over to a statewide committee? Should the committee be
judges? One thing I have noted is the long delay between
the time a new decision comes down and CALJIC discovers
it. Raymond Sinetar comments on these problems in a recent
article. 13, 14
11.
Rptr.
12.
Rptr.
13.
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257 Cal. App.2d 350, 64 Cal.
903 (1967).
262 Cal. App.2d 626, 69 Cal.
10 (1968).
Sine tar, A Belated Look at

CALlIC, 43 Cal. State Bar J. 546
(1968).
14. See also Letters to Editor 43
State Bar Journal 706, 709 (1968).
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Sentencing. Troublesome problems of out-of-state prior
convictions continue to arise. Illustrative is the case of In
re Finley.15 The defendant was convicted of first degree robbery. He admitted a prior second degree burglary in Washington in 1932 and a prior first degree robbery in California,
and was sentenced to life imprisonment as an habitual criminal. He now attacks the determination of habitual criminality because second degree burglary in Washington is defined
differently than in California. There it is entry to commit
any crime whether felony or misdemeanor. Here it is entry
with intent to commit any felony or grand or petit larceny.
The only record available, an authenticated copy of the Washington judgment, does not show whether he entered with
intent to commit a misdemeanor other than petit larceny.
Thus, says the court, the thirty-six year old Washington judgment cannot support a finding of habitual criminality. The
court refused to overrule a line of cases which determined
that by habeas corpus there could be inquiry into the underlying facts of the conviction. 16 This is of course an exception
to the normal rule that review on habeas corpus extends only
to the face of the record. The exception here is because there
is an issue of "fundamental constitutional deprivation." However, the defendant still is serving an indeterminate sentence
of five years to life and his petition for habeas corpus was
denied. He won the battle but lost the war.
Again this year there were numerous decisions involving
the problem of double punishment and the unfortunate language of Penal Code section 654.17 One of the worst was
the case of In re Hayes. 1s There the defendant drove a motor
vehicle with knowledge that his driving privilege was suspended (Vehicle Code section 14601). At the same time
he drove while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
15. 68 Cal.2d 389, 66 Cal. Rptr. 733,
438 P.2d 381 (1968).
16. See, e.g., In re McVickers, 29
Ca1.2d 264, 176 P.2d 40 (1946), as well
as cases cited in Finley.

17. Neal v. California, 55 Cal.2d 11,
9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839 (1960).
18. 68 A.C. 899, 69 Cal. Rptr. 310,
442 P.2d 366 (1968), rehearing granted,
Aug. 8, 1968.
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(Vehicle Code section 23102). He pleaded guilty to both
offenses and was sentenced for both. On habeas corpus he
contended that this was forbidden double punishment. The
court concluded in a 4-3 decision that both offenses constituted a single act and granted the writ. The minority points
out that each offense is obviously a separate offense. One
can drive while intoxicated and properly licensed. One can
drive while sober without a license. They are unrelated
offenses and even accepting the various decisions under section
654, this one is wrong. Both the majority and minority
opinions provide useful summaries of the morass which has
bogged down the court in this area. Hopefully the Penal
Code revision process will straighten it OUt. 19
Appeal. The problem of the duty of counsel on appeal
where there is no merit to the appeal was considered in
People v. Feggans. 20 The problem resulted from Douglas v.
California,l where the United States Supreme Court created
a due process right of counsel on appeal for indigents. It
was compounded by Anders v. California 2 where the same
court discovered another "due process" right, the right to
make frivolous appeals. In F eggans, the California Supreme
Court set forth guidelines for no merit appeals which seem
to go further than required by Anders. Counsel must prepare
a brief setting forth the facts, include citations to the transcript, discuss the legal issues, with citations to appropriate
authority and argue all issues that are arguable. Counsel
will not be permitted to withdraw until the court is satisfied
that he has discharged these duties to the court and client.
19. See, also, People v. Bell, 258
Cal. App.2d 450, 65 Cal. Rptr. 730
(1968) (possession of heroin, marijuana
and amidone is three offenses); People
v. McKerney, 257 Cal. App.2d 64, 64
Cal. Rptr. 614 (1967) (defendant unclothed was shining a flashlight upon
himself; thereafter he saw victim and
assaulted her with intent to commit
rape; the victim screamed; another person saw the naked defendant; misdemeanor offense of indecent exposure set
aside because of § 654); People v. Chap614
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man, 261 Cal. App.2d 149, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1968) (victim after being
robbed of tavern receipts was taken elsewhere and personally robbed and murdered; held to be one offense). There
are a number of other § 654 decisions.
20. 67 Cal.2d 444, 62 Cal. Rptr. 419,
432 P.2d 21 (1967).
1. 372 U.S. 353, 9 L.Ed.2d 811, 83
S.Ct. 814 (1963).

2. 386 U.S. 738, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87
S.Ct. 1396 (1967).
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In other words, it is the duty of the attorney to be intellectually
dishonest. Bertram Ross suggests that he must make such
arguments as that the statute does not apply to American
Indians and there is nothing in the record which shows that
the defendant is not an American Indian, or that the laws
against murder should be repealed. 3 He must be "willing to
'do a snow job' for the court . . . with tongue in cheek
be willing to help the administration of justice by lending his
professional skill to such a travesty of justice." Mr. Ross's
analogy to a Rube Goldberg cartoon is certainly apropos.
Hopefully the public defenders will take over most of the
burden. Who then will want to be a public defender? Who
is going to pay for all this useless garbage? Remember
the good old days when the courts used to chide attorneys for
making frivolous appeals, often naming names in the opinions.
In re Ketcher involved the right of the counsel for a defendant under sentence of death to have his client examined by a
psychiatrist of his choice. The supreme court upheld this
right over contentions that on appeal the attorney would be
bound by the trial record. Two justices dissented.
Habeas corpus. In the case of In re Cameron,s the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He failed to perfect his appeal. Some ten years later
he brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He contends that at the time of the trial a successful appeal would
have opened the way for a new trial and a possible sentence
of death. Since that time the court in People v. Henderson 6
determined that a defendant who successfully appealed a life
sentence conviction could not be sentenced to death. Cameron successfully contended that the risk that he might receive
a death penalty on retrial excused his failure to perfect his
appeal. A three-justice minority was willing to allow habeas
3. Wanted by the Appellate Courts
-Competent Lawyers to Perform Miracles for Indigent Appellants, 43 Cal.
State Bar J. 381 (1968).
4. 68 Ca1.2d 397, 66 Cal.Rptr. 881,
438 P.2d 625 (1968).

5. 68 Ca1.2d 487, 67 Cal. Rptr. 529,
439 P.2d 633 (1968), see also earlier
discussion at note 15 p. 107 supra.
6. 60 Cal.2d 482, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77,
386 P.2d 677 (1963).
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corpus under such circumstances but thought that the majority's attempt to search the recesses of the defendant's mind to
fathom his motivation for abandoning his appeal was "a
chimerical and futile exercise."
Probation. 7 Courts continue to impose rather ridiculous
conditions on probation. They have been known to order a
probationer to stay away from ex-convicts when his wife is an
ex-convict. They order him to stay away from bars when
there is no evidence that drinking had anything to do with his
problems. Illustrative is People v. Dominguez,S where a condition of probation was that the defendant not become pregnant without being married. At the time of her conviction
for second degree robbery she was unmarried and pregnant.
She also had two illegitimate children. She accepted the condition and the judge suggested that she might find out where
the Planned Parenthood Clinic was located. To make a long
story short she became pregnant again while unmarried and
the trial judge revoked probation. The court of appeal held
that the condition of probation was unreasonable. It was unrelated to the robbery. "Contraceptive failure is not an indicium of criminality."
Mentally disordered sex offender commitments. There
were about a dozen decisions involving mentally disordered
sex offender commitments. Most of them arose because of
failure to be fully familiar with the rather involved statutory
scheme and its rather intricate procedural requirements. Two
such cases reached the supreme court. In People v. Foster,9
apparently all concerned overlooked the fact that persons ineligible for probation under the Penal Code are excluded from
the operation of the mentally disordered sex offender provisions by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5500.5. One
can sympathize with those who are forced not only to be
familiar with the sex offender provisions but also with that
7. See, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128,· 19 L.Ed.2d 336, 88 S.C!. 254
(1967), where the court creates some
limited rights to counsel at the time
when sentence is being imposed upon
revocation of probation.
616
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8. 256 Cal. App.2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr.
290 (1967). The opinion collects examples of reasonable and unreasonable
conditions of probation.
9. 67 CaI.2d 604, 63 Cal. Rptr. 288,
432 P.2d 976 (1967).

40

Collings: Criminal Law and Procedure

Criminal Law and Procedure

complex monstrosity, Penal Code section 1203. Foster was
convicted of a violation of Penal Code section 288. Since he
had earlier been convicted of another felony, the sex offender
provisions were inapplicable. However, the court did say he
was entitled to credit on his indeterminate sentence for his
time spent at Atascadero. (How do you know if the Adult
Authority gives such credit in determining an indeterminate
sentence?)
Another decision involving defective proceedings was People v. SUCCOp.l0 The case involved the preliminary determination whether to send the defendant to Atascadero for 90
days for examination. He was not advised of his rights to
make a reply and produce witnesses at his sex offender proceeding. He was also denied a right to cross-examine the
psychiatrists. Furthermore, he was denied a right to produce
evidence on his own behalf. A new hearing was ordered.
Narcotics commitments. There were also numerous decisions involving the complicated procedures for narcotics
commitments. Two are cited in a note. l l In People v. Coley/2
defendant pleaded guilty on the condition that he would be
accepted for narcotics treatment at the California Rehabilitation Center. That Center determined that he was not a fit
subject for confinement and treatment at the Center. The
trial court upheld the Center, but then refused the defendant's
application to withdraw his plea of guilty. This was held to
be an abuse of discretion.
Substantive Criminal Law

Diminished Capacity. Should this court-invented doctrine be denominated as diminished responsibility or diminished capacity? The supreme court is using the latter
10. 67 Ca1.2d 785, 63 Cal. Rptr.
569, 433 P.2d 473 (1967), cert. den. 390
U.S. 983, 19 L.Ed.2d 1281, 88 S.Ct.
1104.
11. These are not discussed here because the supreme court granted hearing
and decided them since the termination
date for coverage in this article. See,

People v. Moore, 68 Cal. Rptr. 98
(1968), 69 Cal.2d - , 72 Cal. Rptr. 800,
446 P.2d 800 (1968); People v. Murphy,
67 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1968), 70 Cal.2d - ,
74 Cal. Rptr. 65, 448 P.2d 945 (1969).
12. 258 Cal. App.2d 787, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 559 (1968).
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expression. However, most of its recent decisions seem
to be grounded on the notion that some defendants because of mental conditions should be held to a lower
degree of responsibility than others. At least some of
these decisions are frankly grounded on the idea that the personal turpitude of the defendant is the distinguishing factor
between first and second degree murder. There will always
be psychiatrists willing to testify to diminished capacity due
to mental defects or conditions. 13 Some of us like the emphasis on personal turpitude of the defendant and are not
too far off from the test of the majority in People v. Goedecke14
where it said that the "controlling issue as to degree depends
not alone on the character of the killing but also on the personal turpitude of the defendant.»l5 The extent of personal
turpitude is a conclusion that a jury is well qualified to make,
certainly more qualified than psychiatrists, or even a majority
of the supreme court. If the court will become aware of the
significance of this and take the next logical step it may escape the bind in which it now finds itself. Psychiatrists should
never be allowed to usurp the functions of the jury any more
than appellate courtS.16 Let us either go back to the jury system or turn the whole mess over to a panel of psychiatrists.
The leading diminished capacity decision of the year, People
v. Bassett,I7 is distinguished mostly by the fact that it was
signed by the entire supreme court. Bassett methodicaIIy
13. Cf. People v. Gentry, 257 Cal.
App.2d 607, 65 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1968),
where court appointed physician testified in a bad check case. Due to defendant's neurotic disorder he had no
intent to cheat or defraud. He cashed
them out of fear that he might lose his
wife and family. His fear kept him
from fully understanding the quality of
his actions!
14. 65 Cal.2d 850, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625,
423 P.2d 777 (1967).
15. To say that I have sympathy with
the test is not to say that I do not
think that the court misapplied it. See
discussion in Cal Law Trends and Developments 1967, at p. 403. I feel that
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the court must turn this issue over to
the trier of fact on properly developed
instructions.
16. Compare Roche, The Criminal
Mind (1958), pp. 108, 617-618. Dr.
Roche says that a psychiatrist who answers moral questions is testifying as a
man, not as a psychiatrist. "The conclusions, the inferences, from the facts
are for the trier of facts." I wrote a
nasty book review of Dr. Roche's award
winning book some years ago. 26 Chicago L. Rev. 485 (1959). My respect
for his ideas-not the way he expresses
them-continues to grow.
17. 69 Cal.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr. 193,
443 P.2d 777 (1968).

CAL LAW 1969

42

Criminal Law and Procedure
Collings: Criminal Law and Procedure

planned and executed the murders of his father and mother.
He knew his crimes were wrong. However, even the district
attorney admitted he was and had been a paranoid schizophrenic. Bassett was convicted of first degree murder. There
was ample psychiatric testimony of diminished capacity, and
very little to the contrary. The court reduced the crime to
second degree murder without even finding it necessary to
talk about personal turpitude.
One can speculate why the court in Bassett did not reduce
the offense to manslaughter, or even not gUilty. Certainly the
diminished capacity doctrine has the effect of creating by judiciallegislation a kind of non-statutory manslaughter. 18 Perhaps People v. Moore 19 furnishes a clue to the unexpressed
reasoning of the court. There, in a court trial, it was contended that the diminished capacity of the defendant reduced
his murder to manslaughter The trial judge expressed as
part of his reasons for refusing to accept this contention the
"societal" problem, the need for something more permanent
than temporary confinement. He was reversed for frankly
expressing his reasoning. Perhaps the supreme court in some
of its decisions does not express its fear of turning loose on
society some of the results of the Frankenstein monster it
created when it invented diminished capacity.
All of this points to the need of legislation. The supreme
court can legislate and create new types of manslaughter but
perhaps it finds itself in difficulties in providing proceduresfor example-to convict someone like Bassett of manslaughter
(maximum 15 years) or acquit him altogether. Bassett must
never be freed. If you doubt this, read the opinion signed by
all the justices. The penal code revision project would continue to allow proof of a mental disease or defect when relevant to prove a state of mind (W ells-Gorshen) . However,
it would require notice that mental condition will be in issue
as is now the case where the defendant pleads not guilty by
18. See People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d
310, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911
(1966); People v. Moore, 257 Cal. App.
2d 740, 65 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1968); Peo-

pIe v. Aubrey, 253 Cal. App.2d 912, 61
Cal. Rptr. 772 (1967).
19. 257 Cal. App.2d 740, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 450 (1968).
CAL LAW 1969

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

619

43

Criminal Law and Procedure
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 22

reason of insanity. Such notice would set in motion a procedure for court appointed psychiatrists much as we have now
when there is a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Even
if the defendant is acquitted by reason of diminished capacity
procedures are set up for his commitment. 2o
A technical problem which has not been resolved in the
area of diminished capacity is whether the trial court has the
duty to give sua sponte a diminished capacity instruction
where some evidence comes before the court as to mental
defect or intoxication. The cases seem to go both ways.l
Homicide. Homicide decisions were rare as earlier pointed
out because the supreme court did decide but one death penalty decision of consequence, a diminished capacity case. Two
other decisions were of interest. In People v. Lilliock,2 the
question was whether it is proper to give a felony-murder instruction when the murder information was returned after the
running of the statute of limitations for the underlying felony.
The court asked for supplemental briefs on this point. No
authority was found either by the court or counsel. The court
felt that the purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter negligent or accidental killings in the course of the felony. It
decided it would permit a felony-murder instruction even
where the statute of limitations would bar prosecution of the
constituent felonies.
In People v. Lovato,S the problem was whether the second
degree felony-murder doctrine applies where the underlying
felony is possession of a concealable weapon by an alien
(Penal Code section 12021). A divided court held that the
doctrine would not apply. By judicial decision the ullder20. See Joint Legislative Committee
for Revision of the Penal Code, Tent.
Draft No.2, §§ 530-535.
1. See, e.g. People v. Fanning, 265
Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr 641
(1968) (should have been given in robbery case; dissent); People v. Muszalski,
260 Cal. App.2d 611, 67 Cal. Rptr. 378
(1968) (not prejudicial in murder case);
People v. Farr, 255 Cal. App.2d 679,
620
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63 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1967) (should have
been given sua sponte in murder case);
People v. Bolton, 255 Cal. App.2d 485,
63 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1967), certiorari denied, 390 U.S. 1032,20 L.Ed.2d 291, S.Ct. - (not error).
2. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
434 (1968).
3. 258 Cal. App.2d 290, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 638 (1968).
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lying felony for second degree murder must be inherently
dangerous to human life. Whether the felony is such is a
judicial determination made by looking at the elements of the
felony in the abstract not the particular facts of the case. 4
The court refused to accept the analogy to cases where it has
been held that possession of a concealable firearm by an exfelon, also in violation of Penal Code section 12021 looked
at in the abstract is inherently dangerous to human life. An
ex-felon has already demonstrated his instability and propensity for crime. On the othyr hand most aliens are law abiding
persons. Simply carrying a concealable firearm does not in
the abstract demonstrate instability.
This case is certainly correct in the light of controlling supreme court decisions. However, it demonstrates some of the
difficulties raised for lower courts when the supreme court
turns from adjudicating to legislating. 5 The defendant carried
the weapon with a purpose to commit murder. By using it he
did demonstrate that the felony-not in the abstract but concretely-was dangerous to life. Looked at abstractly the
carrying of a concealable weapon by an alien, or even by an
ex-felon, is not necessarily dangerous to life. But if the alien
uses it to commit dangerous acts, perhaps the violation of the
statute helps to demonstrate that conscious disregard of human
life which under our judicial decisions distinguishes murder
from manslaughter. Thus in People v. Phil/ips6 the court said
that a killing is second degree murder if "the killing proximately resulted from an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers
the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for
life." The court suggests that the line between murder and
manslaughter depends primarily upon whether a subjective
or objective test is applied "in determining whether the defendant acted with conscious disregard of life." The Lovato
4. People v. Williams, 63 Ca1.2d 452,
47 Cal. Rptr. 7, 406 P.2d 647 (1965);
People v. Phillips, 64 Ca1.2d 574, 51
Cal. Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353 (1966).
5. Cf. Note, Recent Developments-

Ca/ijomia Rewrites the FelollY Murder
Rule, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 690, 697 (1966).
6. 64 Cal.2d 574, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225,
414 P.2d 353 (1966).
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case was tried on a felony-murder theory, not on a reckless
murder theory. It goes back for a possible retrial on that
theory.
Of course, if the Phillips test is properly applied the felonymurder doctrine is really not necessary. However, Phillips
does represent a limitation on the common-law felony-murder
doctrine. The felony-murder doctrine can no longer apply
where the underlying felony, theft by false pretenses, looked
at in the abstract is not dangerous to life. Phillips obtained
money by falsely representing that he could cure a child's cancer without surgery. There was evidence that surgery which
Phillips knew was then contemplated could have saved the
child's life. The trial jury could certainly infer from this and
other evidence, the sort of recklessness described by the court
as the essence of second degree murder, that is, "conscious
disregard of life." But it cannot convict him of second degree
felony-murder.
A man named Roman murdered a police officer. His contention was that he could not be convicted of murder because
the entry of the officers prior to the murder in response to a
child beating complaint was illegal. All the evidence was
that they entered legally. However, the decision in People v.
Roman,7 contains a dictum to the effect that unlawful arrest
no longer furnishes sufficient provocation to reduce murder to
manslaughter. This is the result of the enactment of Penal
Code section 834a in 1957.
Assault and Deadly Weapons. Several decisions involved
interpretation of assault statutes. In People v. Curtis,S the
defendant assaulted a peace officer with a broom handle
during the course of an arrest for burglary. The court found
that there was no probable cause for the arrest. The defendant was held properly convicted of a battery on a peace officer
(Cal. Penal Code section 243). The court read section 243

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/22

7. 256 Cal. App.2d 656, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 268 (1967).
8. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr.
27 I (I968). Hearing granted Sept. 11,
1968. See also, People v. Hooker, 254
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(1967) which holds that a peace officer
who is working part time as a detective
in a store is still a peace officer within
the meaning of Penal Code § 243.
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with section 834a which takes away the right to use force to
resist an arrest by a police officer. It upheld the constitutionality of section 834a.
People v. Romo,9 involved an interpretation of Penal Code
section 4501 (assault with a deadly weapon by person confined
in state prison) and section 4502 (possession of deadly
weapon by person confined in state prison, or at prison camps
or farms). The defendant, a Youth Authority ward, was an
inmate of Deuel Vocational Institution, which is a Department
of Corrections institution. Penal Code section 6082 seems
to limit Title 5 of Part 3, which includes sections 4501 and
4502, to persons in the custody of the Department of Corrections, thus excluding Youth Authority wards. The court
held therefore that the defendant could not be convicted under
the two sections. It modified the judgment to declare defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Penal Code section 245). The dissenting judge read section 2041 as making
sections 4501 and 4502 as applicable to Deuel whether the
inmates were from the Youth Authority or not. It should
be rell";,mbered that Deuel is a medium security institution
which contains some very dangerous individuals. Doubtless
the Department of Corrections will cause remedial legislation
to be introduced.
There were two narrow decisions on definitions under Penal
Code section 12020. The supreme court by a 5-2 decision
held that a long knife is not a "dirk or dagger. "10 A court of
appeal held that what apparently were homemade brass
knuckles were not "metal knuckles."l1 Penal Code section
12020 et seq. obviously are in need of thorough revision.
Kidnaping. Or should I be archaic and say kidnapping?
The United States Supreme Court recently held that the
capital punishment clause of the federal kidnaping act is un9. 256 Cal. App.2d 589, 64 Cal. Rptr.
151 (1967).
10. People v. Forrest, 67 Cal.2d 478,
62 Cal. Rptr. 766, 432 P.2d 374 (1967).
11. People v. Deane, 259 Cal. App.
2d 82, 66 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1968). People v. Williams, 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70

Cal. Rptr. 882 (1968) (§ 243 is constitutional); Pittman v. Superior Court, 256
Cal. App.2d 795, 64 Cal. Rptr. 473
(1967) (conviction under § 245(b) can be
sustained even though assault on police
officer occurred after illegal entry into
house where assault took place).
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constitutional. This is because of failure to set forth a procedure for imposing the death penalty on a defendant who waives
right to jury trial or one who pleads guilty.12 Under the federal statute the defendant is practically forced to waive his
right to trial by jury where he might be given a death penalty
to seek a trial by a judge who cannot impose that penalty.
However, according to one of our courts in People v. Spaniel/ 3
there is no deficiency in the California statute. As construed
by the courts and as a result of Penal Code section 190.1,
either the judge or jury can impose the death penalty.
Whether the supreme court will frustrate the decision may be
a matter of some doubt.
Theft. 14 Can a person who enters an establishment and
makes purchases with a stolen credit card be convicted of burglary? The credit card statute (Penal Code section 484a(b)
(6)) at the time made it a felony if the goods were worth over
$50, otherwise a misdemeanor. The court in People v. Scott 15
answered the question in the negative. It relied on the principle paid down in In re Williamson,16 that a special statute excepts the matter included in a broader general act. If this
decision is correct then the credit card offenses can no longer
be treated as burglary. This would also mean that a person
who uses a stolen credit card to obtain goods over $50 and
commits a homicide in the course of the transaction could not
be convicted under the felony murder rule. Statutes in the
theft area have grown like Topsy and are badly in need of a
complete revision. For example the statute might well provide
that purchases made in various stores with a stolen credit card
could be accumulated to make the offense a felony. For that
matter, why draw the line between felony and misdemeanor
at all?
Vehicle Code. Vehicle Code offenses make up a large part,
12. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570, 20 L.Ed.2d 138, 88 S.C!. 1209
(1968).
13. People v. Spaniel, 262 Cal. App.
2d - , 69 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1968).
14. See People v. Ornforff, 261 Cal.
App.2d 212, 67 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1968),
624
CAL LAW 1969

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/22

for a good description of the "Jamaica
Switch."
15. 259 Cal. App.2d 589, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 432 (1968).
16. 43 Cal.2d 651, 276 P.2d 593
(1954).
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perhaps a majority, of those which come to the attention of the
courts each year. It seems right that Cal Law should at least
mention some of the problems.
One important problem is persons driving with suspended
operators' licenses. There are thousands of them. They at
least have shown signs of being dangerous drivers or their
licenses would not have been suspended. It is not easy to have
a license suspended. Many of them have no public liability
insurance or financial responsibility. The supreme court in
In re Murdock/ 7 practically destroyed enforcement of the laws
against such drivers. The statute, Vehicle Code section
14601, makes it a crime to drive an automobile with knowledge that the operator's license has been suspended. Remember we are dealing with defendants who are quite ready
to mark a letter from the Department of Motor Vehicles with
a curt "Moved, left no address." The Department to date does
not try to contact them personally. It may have to henceforth
with expenses paid by the taxpayers.
Vehicle Code section 14600 (a) requires that any person
with an operator's license who moves notify the Department of
his new address within 10 days. Couple that with the fact
that a defendant who engages in some crime or other activity
which requires suspension of his license is presumed to know
the law-or at least was prior to 1968-is there not constructive knowledge that his license has been suspended? The
supreme court says that is not enough.
In the Murdock case, the defendant was involved in an
automobile accident and had his license suspended. Before
then he had moved and failed to give notice of change of address. The Department notified him of his suspension at his
last known address. This notification letter was returned
marked "Moved, left no address." Thereafter he was arrested
for speeding and driving with a suspended driver's license.
The supreme court 5-2 held that constructive knowledge
(failure to report change of address, accident, etc.) was not
enough. As the dissent pointed out, one who moves frequently
17. 68 Cal.2d 313, 66 Cal. Rptr. 380,
437 P.2d 764 (1968).
40
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and fails to notify the Department of change of address can
now drive indefinitely with a suspended driver's license.
Doubless the Department is working on this problem. Murdock is not a constitutional law case. The legislature can substitute for the word "knowledge" in the statute the terms notice or constructive knowledge and define them carefully.
Another possible solution would be to provide for forfeiture
of motor vehicles driven by a driver with a suspended driver's
license. Why should not the grantors of credit be required to
see that the debtor has a valid license? Department of Motor
Vehicle computers can check this in a few minutes. There
must be 9 or 10 million licensed drivers in California. Surely
there is some way to keep the unlicensed off the roadsperhaps by tying driver's license, motor vehicle registration,
and realistic financial responsibility (i.e. either insurance or
cash deposit) together.
As of this year at least the crime of failure to stop at the
scene of an accident and file reports is not unconstitutional.
The cases of Byers v. Justice Court 18 and People v. Bammes 19
so held. But considering the cases which held it unconstitutional to require a gambler or a possessor of a firearm to register and pay taxes,20 one may wonder if Byers and Bammes
were decided properly (that is, in accordance, with United
States Supreme Court precedents). The courts in Byers and
Bammes try to distinguish these cases. They state that the
purpose of the statutes involved was to coerce evidence from
persons involved in illegal activities. But surely the purpose
of making it a crime for failure to stop at the scene of the
accident is to coerce those involved in illegal activities to stop.
Those innocent of crime would stop anyway. Usually those
who would not stop would be those who thought they might
have committed a crime-e.g. driving under the influence,
18. 265 A.c.A. 1031, 71 Cal. Rptr.
609 (1968). Hearing granted November 12, 1968.
19. 265 Cal. App.2d -,71 Cal. Rptr.
415 (1968).
20. Marchetti v. United States, 390
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U.S. 39, 19 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct.
(1968); Grosso v. United States,
U.S. 62, 19 L.Ed.2d 906, 88 S.Ct.
(1968); Haynes v. United States,
U.S. 85, 19 L.Ed.2d 923, 88 S.Ct.
(1968).

697
390
709
390
722

50

Criminal Law and Procedure
Collings: Criminal Law and Procedure

speeding, etc. In any event, one can't blame the courts for
trying in Byers and Bammes.
Failure to Provide. One of the nastiest problems in every
district attorney's office is failure to provide. The cases are a
nuisance. However, the threat of prosecution is a useful
weapon to keep the "victim" off the welfare rolls and thereby
help the county budget. People v. Sorensen l presents an interesting sidelight on the problem. Can a defendant who
agrees to artificial insemination of his wife later be required
to support the child? If he does not can he be convicted of
failure to provide (Penal Code section 270)? The supreme
court answered these questions affirmatively in a unanimous
opinion. Artificial insemination in California is not adultery.
Nor are the offspring illegitimate. Of course the court had to
stretch the word "father" in Penal Code section 270 a
little.
Sex Crimes. An uncle may be hot-blooded or cold-blooded,
but if he is half-blooded, he cannot be guilty of incest.1! Penal
Code section 285 will not be interpreted to apply to sexual
relations between an uncle and the daughter of defendant's
half sister. Justice McComb dissented.
Two divisions of the court of appeal considered the constitutionality of Penal Code section 286 (sodomy) and section
288a (oral copulation). Both involved consensual relations.
In each it was argued that the statute involved is a violation
of the right to privacy protected as a result of Griswold v.
Connecticut. 3 Neither case was a very good one in which
to raise the issue. In one the act took place in the public
portion of a park restroom. The other took place in
Atascadero. Needless to say each court upheld the constitutionality of the section involved. 4 The tentative penal code
revision would remove penal sanctions from consensual sexual
1. 68 Cal.2d 280, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7,
437 P.2d 495 (1968).
2. People v. Baker, 69 Ca1.2d - , 69
Cal. Rptr. 595, 442 P.2d 675 (1968).
3. 381 U.S. 479, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 85
S.Ct. 1678 (1965).

4. People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App.
2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967), reversed on other grounds, People v.
Frazier, 256 Cal. App.2d 630, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 447 (1967).
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relations of all sorts where adults are involved. s A loitering
statute would take care of the public restroom situation. One
may assume that some place the draftsmen will take care of the
institutional situation.
People v. Smith,6 points to some rather ridiculous problems
in proving a rape case. The prosecutor did not ask the victim
if she was the defendant's wife. Fortunately there was circumstantial evidence that proved she was not. Prosecutors
should not only be careful about following the statute in pleading. They should also follow the pleading in making their
case even if it does make them sound a little foolish. Ask her
if she is married to the defendant. Ask her if the place where
the crime took place is in the county.
Disorderly Conduct. 7 There are numerous disorderly conduct, riot, etc., cases this year. Perhaps a few should be
mentioned.
The supreme court in a very brief opinion upheld the constitutionality of Penal Code section 404.6, relative to incitement to riot. 8 The problem of section 404.6 is that its application is limited to cases where there is a clear and present danger of force or violence. Recent riots have been planned well
ahead of time. Any clear and present danger test is clearly
outmoded and should be overruled. The peace officers need a
right to arrest the inciters well ahead of the riot. Thus if
plans are being made in a public park for a subsequent riot
at the induction center, public safety requires arrests and
charges of offenses against the inciters while they are in the
park. Why wait until the riot takes place in front of the induction center?
Penal Code section 602 subd. (n) [formerly subd. (0)],
5. Joint Legislative Committee for
Revision of the Penal Code, Tent. Draft
No.1, §§ 1600-1608.
6. 263 Cal. App.2d - , 69 Cal. Rptr.
670 (1968); cf. People v Gann, 259 Cal.
App.2d 706, 66 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1968).
7. See, Hinshaw, Riot and the Law:
"Justifiable Homicide," 43 Cal. State
Bar J. 541 (1968); Powell v. Texas, 392
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U.S. 514, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254, 88 S.Ct.
2145 (1968). (It seems that physicians
cannot solve the problem of the common cold any more than lawyers and
courts can solve the problem of the
common drunk.)
8. People v. Davis, 68 Cal.2d 481, 67
Cal. Rptr. 547,439 P.2d 651 (1968).
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making it a crime to refuse to leave a public building upon
request after it is closed to the public, was upheld in Parrish
v. Municipal Court. 9 And Penal Code section 602.7 relative
to failure to leave a campus where directed was upheld in
People v. Agnelio.lO
I had difficulty deciding whether to end this article with a
pervert or a rioter. I finally decided on the latter. Unquestionably both are perverted. Last year the kind people who
worked like slaves to put together this useful and outstanding
publication allowed me to end my article with a "God Bless
You" to a Mrs. Wolff who successfully fought off a pervert.
This year I hope they will give me the satisfaction of doing
the same to someone else who so far is successfully fighting
off other perverts. GOD BLESS YOU PRESIDENT HA Y AKAWA!
9. 258 Cal. App.2d 497,65 Cal. Rptr.
862 (1968).

10. 259 Cal. App.2d 785, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 571 (1968) .
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